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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Corporations-Corporate Entity-Solely Owned Corporations
The concept of the corporate "entity" is accepted generally as the
rationale for keeping the corporate rights and liabilities separate from the
rights and liabilities of the shareholders.' There is authority to the effect
that this "separateness" exists even where the corporation has met the
statutory requirement for incorporators and directors by the use of
"dummy" shareholders. 2 Further, except in Kentucky3 (at least in this
century), it has been held consistently that the acquisition of all the stock
by a single shareholder does not per se destroy, suspend or impair the
corporate entity. 4
§ 118 (1946); Cataldo, -Limited Liability with
1BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS,
One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEmS 473 (1953) ; Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REv. 597 (1936) ; Machen, -CorporatePersonality, 24 HARv. L.
Rxv. 347 (1911).
See also: Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations,14
CALIF. L. REV. 12 (1925); Ballantine, Disregarding the Corporate Entity as a
Regulatory Process, 31 CALn. L. REv. 426 (1942) ; Canfield, Scope of Corporate
Entity Theory, 17 COL. L. REv. 128 (1917) ; Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COL. L. Rv. 643 (1932); Wormser, Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Entity, 12 COL. L. Rv. 496 (1912); Note, Disregarding Corporate
Entity in One-Man Company, 13 CALIF. L. REv. 235 (1925).
2
Irving Co. v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849, 852 (1896) ; Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.,
L. R. (1897) A. C. 22; cf. Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342
(1899) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910).
However, the presumption is that the single shares outstanding in directors are
beneficially owned by the principal stockholder or their existence is disregarded as
immaterial. This "beneficial ownership" is then used as the basis for the disregard
of the corporate entity where equity requires. Meizlisch v. San Francisco Wool
Sorting Co., 213 Cal. 668, 3 P. 2d 310 (1931) ; Montgomery v. Central Nat. Bank
& Trust Co., 267 Mich. 142, 255 N. W. 274 (1934) ; Hanson Sheep Co. v. Farmers'
and Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 163 Pac. 1115 (1917) ; Stony Brook Lumber Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133 At. 556 (1926) ; Marchman v. McCoy Hotel
Operating Co., 21 S. W. 2d 552 (Texas Civ. App. 1929); Western Securities Co.
v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856 (1923) ; Newton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co.,
88 Utah 547, 40 P. 2d 204 (1935) ; Roberts v. Hinton Land Co., 45 Wash. 464, 88
Pac. 946 (1907).
See also: Fuller, The Incorporated Individual; A Study of the One-Mal
Corporation,51 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1938) ; Masten, "One Man Companies"
and Their Controlling Shareholders, 14 CANADIAN BAR REV. 663 (1936) ; ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, § 4.06 (1949).
'Ownership of all the stock by one person results in "suspension" (but not
dissolution) of the corporation until the incoming of new members, Russell Lumber
& Supply Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Russell, 262 Ky. 388, 90 S. W. 2d 272 (1936).
See also: Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, -67 S. W. 2d 703 (1934)
Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531 (1893).
Cases in accord with the "suspension" or "abeyance" concept, but not in this
century are: Bank of Gadsen v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898) ; Swift
v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534 (1886). Cf. Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 70
(Mass. 1833).
See further: WoRmsER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORrpRATE FICTION AND ALLIE
CORPORATE PROBLEMS, at 78 (1927).
'Hollywood Cleaning & Pressing Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service, Inc., 217
Cal. 124, 17 P. 2d 709 (1932); Dunham v. Natural Bridge Ranch Co., 115 Mont.
579, 147 P. 2d 902 (1944) ; Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903) ;
Tilley v. Coykendall, 172 N. Y. 587, 65 N. E. 574 (1902); Commonwealth v. Sunbury Converting Works, 286 Pa. 545, 134 Atl. 438 (1926); Button v. Hoffman, 61
Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 667 (1884).
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However, since the existence of the separate entity is a statutory
privilege, it has been confined judicially to legitimate uses. For example,
the corporate entity cannot be used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. 5 Further, corporateness will be
set aside whenever it is asserted for a purpose inconsistent with the policy
of the law for which the concept of corporate entity was developed.0 ,
This power to "disregard the corporate entity" is, therefore, a discretionary or equitable power, used to obtain a just result according to the
circumstances of the case and the conflicting rights and liabilities of the
7
parties.
It is true that corporations owned by a single shareholder have been
In the last case, the sole shareholder was not permitted to pass title to property
held in the corporate name, since "the shareholders are not the private and joint
owners of its [the corporation's] property." The court also said: ". . . the owner
of all the capital stock of a corporation does not own its property, or any of it, and
does not himself become the corporation as a natural person, to own its property
and do business in his own name."
The fact that one corporation owns all the capital stock of another corporation
and that members of the board of directors of both companies are the same is not
sufficient to render parent corporation liable for contracts of its subsidiary, in
absence of additional circumstances showing fraud, actual or constructive, or agency.
Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable Service, 224 N. C. 628, 32 S. E. 2d 34
(1944). (Judgment for plaintiff was upheld on the agency theory.)
Sole shareholder cannot sue individually for a wrong to the corporation, Green
v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F. 2d 378, cert. denied 278 U. S. 602 (1928).
' Mosher v. Salt River Valley Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P. 2d 1077 (1932) (corporation held the "alter ego of the defendant") ; Mosher v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac.
35 (1927) (incorporated partners) ; Rice v. Sanger Bros., 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397
(1924) (to defraud creditors by illegal act) ; Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Warren Light & Water Co., 170 Ark. 50, 278 S.W. 643 (1925) ; Donovan v. Purtell,
216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334 (1905) (fraud) ; Noble v. Burnett Co., 208 Mass. 75, 94
N. E. 289 (1911); Brassman, Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215 N. Y. S.766
(1926) (president issued corporate check) ; Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F. 2d 497 (5th
Cir. 1941) cert. denied 313 U. S.583 (1941) (inadequate capital) ; U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (1905) ; In re Muncie Pulp
Co., 139 Fed. 546 (1905) (to defraud creditors) ; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S.295
(1939); Linn and Lane Timber Co. v. U. S., 236 U. S. 574 (1915) (fraud in
obtaining government land).
'Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S.114, 117 (1925) (dominant company held for
injuries due to negligence of subsidiary company) ; United States v. Reading Co.,
253 U. S.26 (1919); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U. S.490 (1917) (for purpose of rate regulation) ; U. S. v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 220 U. S.257 (1911).
Cardozo, J., in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926),
stated the surrender of limited liability would be made "when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld." (However, there the dominant shareholder was held not liable for torts of subsidiary.)
See also: WORMSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATE PROBLEMS, at 83, 84 (1927) : "Corporate entity will not be ignored at
law or equity simply because the number of shareholders is few or even one, unless
the circumstances are such as would warrant the same disregard of the entity were
there ten thousand shareholders."
See further: Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary
Corporations,18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 473, 475 (1953).
For a thorough development of this fluid concept, see Cataldo, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 480.
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brought under close scrutiny by the courts,8 ever ready to apply the above

equitable criteria. But it is rare that such corporations have been
deemed automatically invalid on the ground that the number of shareholders has fallen below a certain prescribed minimum number.9 However, that the North Carolina Supreme Court will apply this automatic
criterion was made clear in the recent case of Park Terrace, Inc. v.
Phoenix Indemnity Company,10 which was before the court on a rehearing of the same case reported two years prior."
In the first Terrace case, the facts were set out as follows: Terrace,
Inc., all the common stock of which was owned by A, B, C, and D, contracted for the construction of an apartment house with Builders, Inc.,
some of the stock of which was owned also by A, B, C, and D. Subsequently, these four shareholders sold all the shares of common stock of
Terrace, Inc., to McLean, an individual. As part of the consideration
for the transaction, McLean signed a contract releasing A, B, C, D and
Builders, Inc., from liability for defective construction. Two years and
ten months later, Terrace, Inc., brought an action for damages for breach
of construction contract by Builders, Inc., against the surety on the performance bond. Builders, Inc. was made a party defendant. The defendants alleged: (1) that the construction was in accordance with specifications; (2) that the release, signed by McLean, was a bar to recovery
by Terrace, Inc.; and (3) that when McLean signed the agreement, he
was acting as agent for Terrace, Inc., and in its behalf, therefore Terrace,
Inc., was bound by his contract.
The Supreme Court affirmed an order to strike allegations (2) and
(3) from the answer and to deny making McLean a party defendant.
BARNHILL, C. J., said: ".... the refusal of the court to make McLean a
party defendant was well advised. The purchase of outstanding common
stock from the then owners thereof was by McLean as an individual.
He signed the so-called release as an individual. Hence, these defendants may not be permitted to try any action they may have against
McLean in this suit.'

2

The majority decision then rested on the issue

of agency, holding that the contract signed by McLean was not the contract of the corporation. 13 Thus, the corporate entity was regarded as a
'Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 313 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1920) ; Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S.
587, 590 (1875).
In Pepper v. Litton, the District Court said: "... In all the experience of law,
there has never been a more prolific breeder of fraud than the one-man corporation."
"See note 3 supra.
10243 N. C. 595, 91 S. E. 2d 584 (1956).
' 1 Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N. C. 473, 85 S. E. 2d 677
(1955).
12
Id. at 477. 85 S. E. 2d at 679.
1
3Id.at 478. 85 S. E. 2d at 679. The modern weight of authority supports thle
holding that contracts of a sole shareholder will bind the corporation, although made
without the authority of a board of directors. The reason for this rule is that the
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legal fact even though the majority opinion was dosed with the query:
"Since McLean has acquired all the stock of the plaintiff, is it now a corporation? This question is not presented by the record."' 14
A well reasoned dissent by BOBBITT, J., however, indicated that the
substance of the action was not the agency issue, but ".

.

. whether

McLean can maintain under the guise of a corporation suit an action for
his benefit as sole owner of the plaintiff's common stock."'u The dissent
went on to say: "... courts and textwriters have been in entire agreement that equity will look behind the corporate entity, and consider who
are the real and substantial parties in interest, whenever it becomes
necessary to do so to promote justice or obviate inequitable results."'"
The import of this dissent was adopted in the second Terrace case.
BARNHILL, C. J., again writing for the majority of the court, held that
McLean was, in fact, the necessary party plaintiff.17 In so holding, the

court stated the rule that when one person acquires all the stock of a
corporation, automatically the corporation becomes dormant or inactive
and can no longer act as a corporation.' 8 Thus, the court has adopted
the view that a one-man 19 corporation is invalid per se for all purposes
except to hold legal title of the property for the use and benefit of the
single stockholder who becomes seized of the beneficial title to the property. Spelled out further, the import of the decision is that the court
will apply the equitable criteria when the corporation has met the requisite number of three shareholders; and will apply the automatic criterion
below that number.
The ramifications of such a holding are apparent. For example: (1)
Is the income of the corporation to be considered the income of the shareholder, thereby making the shareholder taxable on the income without
the benefit of corporate deductions or the corporate rates? (2) If the
corporation can hold title to the property for the use and benefit of the
shareholder, could it transfer the same property. And what would be
the present status of property already transferred by a wholly-owned
corporation? (3) Are all the debts of the corporation to be considered
sole shareholder is the only person beneficially interested aside from corporate
creditors. See 5 FLETcHER, CYc. OF CORPORATIONS, § 2099, at 442 (perm. ed. 1952).
See also BALLANTINE,

CORPORATIONS,

§ 126, at 296 (1946).

21
Ibid.
'Id.
at 479-80. 85 S. E. 2d at 681.
"1d.
at 481. 85 S. E. 2d at 682. By so stating this proposition, Justice Bobbitt
placed before the court the very crux of the equitable criteria.
" Note that Bobbitt, J., and Johnson, J., concur in the result of the case.
18 243 N. C. 595, 597, 91 S.E. 2d 586, 587 (1956). The reason for this rule of
form was stated to be: ".. . the concept that a corporation is a combination of three
or more persons who may operate as a legal entity when chartered so to do threads
its way through the cited and practically every other section of our law on corporations. General Statutes, ch. 55. No lesser number will stff ce." (Emphasis added.)
" Ibid. This statement indicates clearly that the same result would obtain in
a two-man corporation since this, also, is below the "statutory" minimum.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

1956]

as debts of the single shareholder? If so, what are the rights of corporate
creditors against the individual?
In the light of these complexities, it would seem the proper response
of a single shareholder to take immediate curative action by transferring
shares to nominal shareholders in order to comply with the requisite for
three shareholders. However, for past transactions, this course of action
is dubious, at most, in view of dictum in the principal case, to the effect
that "....

it must be understood that if McLean became the sole beneficial

owmer of the assets of the corporation by virtue of the fact he acquired
all the stock, he could not later, and cannot now, evade the consequences
of his act by merely transferring some of the stock to third parties so as
to comply with the statute. ' 20 (Emphasis added.)
Read literally, this dictum would cause legitimate concern for every
corporation now beneficially owned by a single shareholder, in that curative action would be impossible once the status had been attained. However, if the language used can be construed to apply to the specific act
of McLean and to the circumstances of this case, it will be possible to
effect remedial transfer of shares in other situations and avoid troublesome future problems. Of course, even the latter interpretation does not
indicate a solution to transactions already having occurred. At best, the
language used by the court leaves this retroactive aspect very unsettled
and in need of clarification and immediate remedy.
Apparently, the assembly, in passing the new Business Corporation
Act,2 ' contemplated the situation presented by the principal case. Section 55-8 of this Act states: "Corporate existence is not impaired by the
acquisition of all the shares by one person. '22 Further, in section 5553(e), the Act states: "Except in the case of watered shares, shareholders shall be subject to no assessment or liability thereon other than
that arising from the unpaid balance, if any, of the agreed consideration,
even if all the shares are owned by one person." However, this Act, if
allowed to stand as passed by the 1955 legislature, will not become effective until 1 July, 1957. Accordingly, the need is still urgent for present
judicial or legislative remedy.
As to the equitable power of the court to meet situations of this
nature, this also has been embodied in the new Business Corporation Act
in section 55-53(h), which states: "Nothing in this section shall limit
any liability that a shareholder may incur on general principles of law
or equity arising from the creation or maintenance of an inadequately
20243 N. C. 595, 599, 91 S. E. 2d 586, 588 (1956).
STAT., Cia. 55 (Supp. 1955).
theory of permitting a corporate existence to remain unimpaired when
owned by a single shareholder is inconsistent with a requirement for three incorporators. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-6 (Supp. 1955). If the law has the former policy
there is no need for the latter.

2N
N. C. GEN.
"The
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capitalized incorporated enterprise or other abuse of the privilege of
achieving limited liability by incorporation."
The equitable criteria has been an adequate test for the existence or
non-existence of the corporate entity in any conceivable combination of
rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, it seems illogical that the
court would feel the need of establishing a rule of automatic invalidity.
Because of this implication, however, it is clear that the Terrace case will
have a disturbing impact on the law of this area until a judicial or legislative remedy is presented.
FRANKLiN

A.

SNYDER.

Criminal Law-Entrapment in North Carolina
It has been said' that the first reported instance of a defense of entrapment is to be found in the decision by the Great Lawgiver, overruling
that ancient plea tendered by Eve in Paradise, "The serpent beguiled me
'2
and I did eat.
The earliest reported pleas in North Carolina of temptation by others,
appear in the cases of Dodd v. Hamilton3 and State v. Jernagan4 in
1817, and since that time the defense has often been interposed in the
North Carolina courts. Perhaps the most enlightening approach to a
presentation of the position of the North Carolina court on the doctrine
of entrapment is an examination of the cases against a background of
the subject generally.
The classic, and most frequently cited definition of entrapment is that
of Mr. Justice Roberts, in Sorrells v. United States.5 "Entrapment is
the conception and planning of an offense by an officer and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have done so except for
the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." 0
The basis for the doctrine of entrapment seems to be ethical rather
than legal considerations. 7 The judicial approach to the problem does
not lay stress upon any feeling of solicitude for the accused or try to
strike a balance between the equities of the government and those of the
accused. Rather, it seems to stem from a realization by the courts that
the law is mechanistic in that it does not consider the ability of the offender to resist temptation. As Professor Sayre declared: "Historically,
our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the
vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between
'Bernstein, In Re Eve. 65 N.J. L. J. 273 (1942).
2Genesis 3:13.
24 N.C. 31 (1817).
'4N. C. 44 (1817).
287
U. S. 435 (1932).
Id. at 440.
'Anderson, Some Aspects of Entrapment, 13 BROoKLYN L. RLv. 187, 188
(1942) ; Note, 2 So. CALIn. L. REv. 283 (1929).

